DEUDA, CORRUPCIÓN Y MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN EN ENTIDADES FEDERATIVAS DE MÉXICO. EL SILENCIO DE LA CONTINUIDAD

Abstract

This paper uses information from local public debt, local corruption surveys and information on local media to estimate the impact of corruption and local borrowing in alternating governorships. We show that citizens do not punish corruption and excessive debt with their vote; on the contrary, with increased debt, the probability for the same party to continue ruling is greater (on average, 3.1% per billion of Mexican pesos of debt). This research is an empirical contribution to the Mexican case linking corruption, local government debt and alternating, three variables that had not been previously analysed together. We show that the local media do not play an important role in disseminating information about corruption and therefore have no impact on alternation. Our results highlight the importance of having a more informed electorate and the role of local media in improving political selection.